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Introduction 
In a society which gives legal recognition to the right to life,1 the state is required to have laws 
which ensure that, as a right, this is respected.2  Thus, causing the death of another is, generally, 
absolutely proscribed and murder, one part of the recognition of this principle in criminal law, 
is, on occasion, described as the most serious crime3 - though even murder can be aggravated.4  
Indeed, protection for the sanctity of life has been a part of Scots law throughout its history.5  
In 1827, for example, Lord Mackenzie was able to state that ‘[t]he law of Scotland is peculiarly 
tender of human life’.6 
Murder is not, however, the only crime which can be charged where the accused has caused 
death.  Scots law also encompasses the lesser offence of culpable homicide demonstrating that 
it is not merely the taking of life which murder censures (because culpable homicide sends this 
message too) but the particularly seriously wrong way in which, and/or (wicked) mindset with 
which, this is done.  While identifying the relative seriousness of (even broadly similar) crimes 
                                                          
1 For example, Art 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights [1950] states ‘Everyone's right to life shall 
be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a 
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.’ 
2 A v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 611.  See also McCann v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 97 
3 See, eg Barry Mitchell and Julian Roberts, ‘Public Attitudes Towards the Mandatory Life Sentence for Murder: 
Putting Received Wisdom to the Empirical Test’ [2011] Crim LR 456, 456; David Ormerod, ‘Worth the Wait?’ 
[2012] Crim LR 79, 80; Isabel Grant, ‘The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Criminalization of the Non-
Disclosure of HIV’ (2008) 31 Dalhousie Law Journal 123, 125; Felicity Stewart and Arie Freiburg, ‘Provocation in 
Sentencing: A Culpability-Based Framework’ (2008) 19 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 283, 302 
4 For example, the Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) makes reference 
to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’ defining these (in Art 5(1)) 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression 
5 Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, Law and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (James Glen 1678) 
109; Baron David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes, vol 1 (Benjamin R Brown ed, 
4th edn, Bell & Bradfute 1844 (The Law Society of Scotland 1986)) chap VI 
6 Spring-Gun Case (1827) Syme 209, 214 
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in relation to each other is not straightforward,7 a murder conviction signals that the killing was 
grave and the perpetrator was conspicuously blameworthy.  Given, however, that the 
mechanisms by which one person may be the agent of the destruction of the life of another are 
myriad, from a relatively minor act which activates a pre-existing condition8 to an entirely 
intentional attack using extreme violence which is inflicted in order to kill,9 there are 
advantages in relation to quantifying seriousness in having these two separate offences. 
This paper examines the crime of culpable homicide, looking, in particular, at the way in which 
it navigates the broad range of behaviours which may be brought within its own ambit of lesser 
seriousness in killing. Criminalisation is generally only regarded as necessary or justified at all 
for seriously harmful behaviours.  Killing is perhaps the clearest example of such a behaviour 
– few would dispute the need to criminalise murder – and culpable homicide also reflects 
society’s absolute repugnance towards killing by ensuring that the criminal sanction is still 
imposed even where the destruction of life was not deliberate but the by-product of some other 
reprehensible behaviour. 
In fulfilling this function, culpable homicide occupies potentially more difficult, and certainly 
rather broader, terrain than murder, extending from killing which is so serious as to sit on the 
borderline with it to that which, for any of a wide variety of reasons, renders the agent of the 
death so unblameworthy that the question may be whether to prosecute for a homicide offence 
at all. 
This paper will first of all provide an overview of the way in which culpable homicide is 
defined in Scots law.  It will then consider the way in which it operates on the borderline with 
murder – where the accused has killed in a manner which bears possible hallmarks of the more 
                                                          
7 See, for example, Matthew Gibson, ‘Getting their “Act” Together? Implementing Statutory Reform of 
Offences Against the Person’ [2016] Crim LR 597 
8 See, for example, Bird v HM Advocate 1952 JC 23 
9 The point is raised in HM Advocate v R 2010 GWD 35-722 
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serious crime but the lesser offence is, in fact indicated.  Next, it will move to consider culpable 
homicide in its own right where this is the crime to be charged from the outset. The law 
recognises two forms of this “involuntary” type: lawful act and unlawful act.  Finally, it will 
draw on these discussions to evaluate the efficacy of the offence as it operates in Scots criminal 
law currently. 
 
Defining Culpable Homicide in Scots Law  
Culpable homicide occupies the borderlands of killing less than murder – concerned with the 
reasons for deeming (otherwise serious) killings “not murder” at one end of the spectrum and 
with the reasons for convicting of an offence of homicide at all at the other, whilst also 
accommodating any killing which is clearly culpable homicide (rather than murder) from the 
outset.  This highlights the broad range of the crime from killings which are relatively grave 
(not quite murder) to those which only just qualify as criminally blameworthy at all. 
Unlike other areas of homicide law,10 and perhaps surprisingly, there is no time-honoured 
definition to which all cases initially make reference.  Instead, the crime tends to be described 
rather than defined.  Thus, in Drury v HM Advocate11 it was stated that ‘the crime of culpable 
homicide covers the killing of human beings in all circumstances, short of murder, where the 
criminal law attaches a relevant measure of blame to the person who kills’.12  
                                                          
10 For example, the definition of: murder – originally stated in Sir John H A Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on 
the Criminal Law of Scotland (Roger McGregor Mitchell ed, 4th edn 1929) 89 and see HM Advocate v Purcell 
[2007] HCJ 13, 2008 JC 131, [9] (Lord Eassie); provocation – Macdonald, 94; diminished responsibility – 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 51B 
11 2001 SLT 1013 
12 ibid [13] (LJ-G Rodger).  This dictum has been cited with approval in subsequent cases including Transco plc v 
HM Advocate No 1 2004 JC 29 [4] (Lord Osborne); and Lilburn v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 41, 2012 JC 150 [4] 
(LJ-G Hamilton) 
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On this basis, then, culpable homicide incorporates any killing which is not murder but which 
is still criminally blameworthy.  By, effectively, identifying the crime as “not murder” this 
description draws murder’s own definition into the equation: 
‘Murder is constituted by any wilful act causing the destruction of life, whether [wickedly] 
intended to kill, or displaying such wicked recklessness as to imply a disposition depraved 
enough to be regardless of consequences.’13 
Culpable homicide shares with murder the actus reus (the destruction of life).  Macdonald 
writes of the ‘death of a person [being] caused, or materially accelerated by the improper 
conduct of another’.14  In general, then, since both murder and culpable homicide arise through 
the killing of another person, this first dividing line between them is drawn by whether one or 
other of murder’s two alternative mentes reae (wicked intention to kill or wicked recklessness) 
can be established.  The proximity between the two forms of homicide, at this level of 
seriousness, can be seen in this description, from Ross v Lord Advocate,15 a case concerning 
the Lord Advocate’s policy on the prosecution of assisted suicide.  Lord Justice-Clerk 
Carloway stated: 
if a person does something which he knows will cause the death of another 
person, he will be guilty of homicide if his act is the immediate and direct 
cause of the person's death16 ... Depending upon the nature of the act, the 
crime may be murder or culpable homicide. Exactly where the line of 
causation falls to be drawn is a matter of fact and circumstance for 
                                                          
13 Macdonald (n 10) 89 (as amended by Drury (n 11) [11] (LJ-G Rodger) 
14 Macdonald (n 10) 150 
15 [2016] CSIH 12, 2016 SC 502 
16 (referencing MacAngus v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 8, 2009 SLT 137 [42] (LJ-G Hamilton)) 
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determination in each individual case. That does not, however, produce any 
uncertainty in the law.17 
The question of whether the law is certain may be debatable – indeed the view has been 
expressed elsewhere that ‘the mental element in murder and culpable homicide in 
contemporary Scots law … is in need of a thorough re-examination’18  What is clear, however, 
is that descriptions such as these from Drury and Ross alone would leave culpable homicide as 
rather an amorphous category, lacking even a clear definition of actus reus and mens rea.  In 
practice, then, it is divided into voluntary and involuntary forms, with the latter being 
subdivided into lawful act and unlawful act types.  While these divisions have existed since 
historical times,19 conviction will always be of the generic offence of culpable homicide 
without necessarily much discussion of the form.  These forms do, however, have slightly 
clearer definition. 
Voluntary culpable homicide arises where the accused has killed in a way which would, in 
principle, satisfy the definition of murder but a partial defence (of provocation or of diminished 
responsibility) operates to “reduce” the crime to the lesser form.20 These defences are discussed 
in detail elsewhere in this series21 and voluntary culpable homicide will not, therefore, be 
considered in detail in this chapter.  Involuntary culpable homicide generally arises where the 
death of the deceased was not within the accused’s actual or deemed contemplation but s/he is 
                                                          
17 Ross (n 15) [29] (LJ-C Carloway).  Emphasis added. 
18 Petto v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 80, 2012 JC 105 [20] (LJ-C Gill) 
19 Hume (n 5) identified ‘Culpable homicide by doing a lawful act without due caution’ 233, ‘Culpable homicide 
where death ensues on a purpose to do some slight injury’ 235 and ‘Culpable homicide where there is a mortal 
purpose, but taken up on gross provocation’ 239 
20 MacAngus (n 16) [27].  The terminology of ‘reducing’ is not accepted in Drury (n 11) where LJ-G Rodger 
described it as ‘essentially misleading’ [17] however it has continued to be used.  See James Chalmers and 
Fiona Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (W Green 2006) para 1.02 n 6 
21 Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds), Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, 
Comparative and International Perspectives (Routledge 2011).  For a discussion of provocation in Scots law, see 
Claire McDiarmid, ‘Don’t Look Back in Anger: the Partial Defence of Provocation in Scots Criminal Law’ in James 
Chalmers, Lindsay Farmer and Fiona Leverick (eds) Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon 
(Edinburgh University Press 2010) 
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nonetheless considered to be sufficiently blameworthy for it that criminal liability is entailed.  
The unlawful act type arises where the accused is involved in committing another crime (in 
modern times this is almost invariably the crime of assault) and death ensues.  Macdonald 
explains this category as “the doing of any unlawful act … from which death results though 
not foreseen or probable”.22  The mens rea is that for the underlying crime.  Involuntary lawful 
act culpable homicide,23 by contrast, occurs where the accused’s act is (for these purposes) 
lawful but nonetheless causes the victim’s death.  The mens rea is recklessness.24 
The way in which culpable homicide operates at the top end of seriousness (where the issue is 
the division with murder) will be considered first. 
 
Murder or Culpable Homicide: Policy Decisions 
It is fair to say that one of the functions of culpable homicide is to make it possible for the law 
to be seen to acknowledge the inherent wrongfulness of killing, without the “baggage” (stigma 
and mandatory life sentence25) of murder.  This being the case, on occasion, it may seem that 
the decision as to category (murder or culpable homicide) is taken for policy reasons without 
clearly engaging legal principle.  Such killings, then, though named culpable homicide, may 
be particularly difficult to classify in terms of seriousness.  Precisely for that reason of the 
difficulty of fitting them into the homicide binary however, they clearly sit on the line with 
murder.  In other words, there are perhaps equally good reasons to classify as one as the other. 
Prior to trial, such decisions are entirely the Crown’s. ‘In Scotland the master of the instance 
in all prosecutions for the public interest is the Lord Advocate. It is for him to decide when and 
                                                          
22 Macdonald (n 10) 150 
23 See Transco (n 12) [35]– [38] (Lord Hamilton) 
24 ibid 
25 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 205 
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against whom to launch prosecution and upon what charges.’26 Given the range of ways in 
which, and reasons for which, death may be caused, the public interest encompasses a wide 
variety of considerations.  The concept of ‘mercy killing’ may illustrate these points.  In HM 
Advocate v Brady,27 the accused had, at least prima facie, met the (then) requirements of murder 
by destroying the life of the victim (his terminally ill brother) with intention to kill.  He had 
administered a high dose of the deceased’s prescription medicine to render him unconscious 
and had then smothered him with a pillow. Whilst the original charge was murder, the Crown 
accepted a plea of guilty to culpable homicide. The other members of the family (who, given 
the nature of the killing were the family of both the deceased and the accused) supported the 
accused’s actions and were relieved that the deceased’s suffering (from Huntingdon’s disease) 
was at an end.28  The trial judge imposed the most lenient sentence available (admonishment). 
Here, the existence of culpable homicide allowed the Crown leeway to balance the competing 
public interests in respecting the very particular wishes and interests of the deceased’s family 
for clemency against the fact of the, entirely deliberate, taking of the life of another.29  The 
structure of homicide allows this to be accomplished at conviction rather than merely through 
sentencing.  It also raises that question of the way in which the law mediates its own principles.  
The Crown’s decision to accept the plea of guilty to culpable homicide may meet the justice of 
the case (though, for example, church leaders were not in agreement with it, considering that it 
failed to uphold the importance of the sanctity of life).30  Nonetheless, it allocates the issue 
                                                          
26 Boyle v HM Advocate 1976 JC 32, 37 (Lord Cameron) 
27 1997 GWD 1-18 
28 ‘Family Declare Support for Brother’s Mercy Killing’ The Herald (Glasgow 1 October 1996) (available at: 
<http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/12024044.Family_declare_support_for_brother_apos_s_mercy_killer
/> accessed 1 January 2018) 
29 Having given the deceased increased quantities of his standard medication and some alcohol, the accused 
then smothered the deceased with a pillow 
30 ‘Family Declare Support’ (n 28) 
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wholly to the Crown’s discretion thereby bypassing the law on the distinction from murder.  It 
does not assist in understanding, or developing, the legal principles of that distinction. 
The more recent case of Ross v Lord Advocate31 concerned the related issue of assisted suicide, 
where a seriously ill petitioner sought further guidance from the Lord Advocate as to the 
circumstances in which anyone helping him to bring his own life to an end would be 
prosecuted.  As noted above, the Inner House of the Court of Session simply accepted that the 
law of homicide would apply,32 again failing to differentiate murder from culpable homicide at 
the level of principle in such circumstances.  While clearly the so-called right to die raises 
particularly fraught issues of law, ethics, morality and compassion it is precisely in such cases, 
and because of the intense anxiety which attends them, that clearer legal principle is particularly 
valuable and necessary.  Without bespoke legislation in relation to assisted suicide, the 
common law on homicide requires to do this work. 
 
The Line with Murder 
Such policy decisions are, then, concerned with the usefulness of having a lesser form of 
homicide available rather more than with the legal principles.  Where the matter is not 
determined at a preliminary stage on policy grounds but is tested in court, legal reasons for the 
outcome become available for scrutiny. Thus, to be convicted of culpable homicide, such a 
reason must be identified.  Is there, however, any remaining scope to apply the binary question 
of murder / not murder rather than clearly to cast the determination in terms of culpable 
homicide’s own mental and behavioural elements?  
                                                          
31 Ross (n 15) 
32 See text accompanying n 17 
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Because murder and culpable homicide share the actus reus of the destruction of life,33 in 
principle, the question for a court to determine is whether or not the accused has the mens rea 
of murder.34  For murder, both possible mental elements incorporate wickedness (wicked 
recklessness or wicked intention to kill) and both require some attitude on the part of the 
accused towards the death of the victim.35  The accused must either have (wickedly) intended 
to kill the victim or else have had (in addition to an intention to cause physical injury)36 an 
indifference as to whether the victim lived or died.37  It is possible for the matter to be 
determined by reference to the (tautologically) murderous quality of the act itself.38 
The fact that conviction of the lesser offence is always for the generic crime of culpable 
homicide creates possible scope for the argument, not necessarily that the accused’s crime 
conforms to the principles of culpable homicide in either its voluntary or involuntary form but 
rather that the accused is, simply, insufficiently blameworthy to be convicted of murder.  In 
other words, the argument is that the crime committed is “not murder” rather than that it is (on 
its own terms) culpable homicide.  Where such an argument is led in an appeal, the fact that 
the jury at first instance has returned a murder conviction supports the seriousness of such cases 
and indicates that, even if they could constitute culpable homicide, they still occupy this liminal 
territory right on the line with murder. 
In such cases, the accused’s claim is likely to be that the scope for a culpable homicide verdict 
(and hence a more favourable outcome for him/her) was not fully exploited thereby resulting 
                                                          
33 Gerald H Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, vol 2 (4th edn, James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick (eds) W 
Green 2017) para 30.01 
34 See, for example, Scott v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 110, 2012 SCCR 45 [10], [16] (Lord Bonomy) 
35 For a full discussion, see Claire McDiarmid ‘”Something Wicked This Way Comes”: The Mens Rea of Murder 
in Scots Criminal Law’ (2012) Juridical Review 283 
36 See Purcell (n 10) 
37 See, for example, Cowie v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 76, 2010 JC 51 [21] (LJ-C Gill) 
38 See Meikle v HM Advocate [2014] HCJAC 116, 2014 SLT 1062 [15] (Lord Drummond Young); Humphrey v HM 
Advocate [2016] HCJAC 5, 2016 SCL 275 [32] (LJ-C Carloway) 
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in detriment. Following Ferguson v HM Advocate,39 the (murder) trial judge has a 
responsibility to put the possibility of a culpable homicide verdict (indeed any alternative 
verdict reasonably available on the evidence) to the jury unless there is no basis at all on which 
such a verdict could be returned. In principle, then, this is an issue of procedure however it 
requires an assessment of the principles of the substantive law on homicide by the trial judge 
to determine whether a culpable homicide instruction needs to be given. 
In Ferguson, and the subsequent case of Anderson v HM Advocate,40 such an instruction had 
been omitted.  Both appeals are concerned with the nature of the act bringing about death.  In 
Ferguson a single stab wound to the back, just below the shoulder blade was considered still 
to leave open the possibility of a culpable homicide verdict41 because only the one wound was 
inflicted (rather than “multiple injuries”)42 and this was not regarded as a “particularly 
vulnerable area[…] of the body”.43  By contrast, in Anderson, a single stab wound to the 
abdomen, directed upwards so that it injured the heart was considered to preclude any such 
option because this was a “vulnerable part of the deceased’s body and in particular [because it 
was] in the direction of his heart.”44  It can be seen, then, that the actus reus of murder is not 
entirely separate from the mens rea.  Certain acts – here, a stab wound to a vulnerable part of 
the body - allow at least wicked recklessness to be inferred.  Culpable homicide is mobilised 
to sweep up any possibility of lesser blameworthiness (even where this is ultimately rejected). 
Such appeals are, of course, concerned with the review of the matter undertaken by the trial 
judge, who, in determining how to frame the charge to the jury, is likely to have considered 
                                                          
39 [2008] HCJAC 71, 2009 SLT 67.  See also Woodside v HM Advocate [2010] HCJAC 94, 2011 JC 100 
40 [2010] HCJAC 9, 2010 SCCR 270 
41 Ferguson was re-tried following the success of his appeal and was again convicted of murder: ”Evil Airdrie 
Thug Convicted for Teenager’s Playground Murder” Daily Record (Glasgow 12 August 2009) (available at :< 
https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/local-news/evil-airdrie-thug-convicted-teenagers-2831954> accessed 12 
January 201 
42 Ferguson (n 39) [37] (Lord Osborne) 
43 ibid 
44 Anderson (n 40) [17] (Lord Mackay of Drumadoon) 
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whether, and why, culpable homicide (on its own principles) was or was not an option.  At the 
appeal stage, the issue is cast more in terms of whether or not murder is unequivocally 
indicated.  The argument here is not that the principles of culpable homicide have no relevance.  
It is rather that they tend to be subsumed in the more general, higher level question of whether 
the crime must be characterised as murder. 
Another area in which the resort to a culpable homicide verdict on a murder charge sits a little 
outside the voluntary / involuntary formulations is in relation to art and part killing. 
 
Art and Part Killings 
The particularities of Scots law on killing on an art and part basis are such that, in some 
circumstances, individual co-accused can seek to argue that grounds exist for a conviction of 
culpable homicide even where others are convicted of murder.45  The distinction between 
murder and culpable homicide is generally underpinned by principle in that a distinction exists 
between killing where there is pre-concert and killing which arises spontaneously,46 though 
this distinction has been described as ‘nonsensical’.47 
Where a crime is pre-arranged and there is a common plan to commit it then all co-accused 
who are parties to that plan must be convicted of the same offence.48 Again, the key issue is 
whether or not the accused has the mens rea for murder which, in such cases, relates to analysis 
of the plan.  Thus 
                                                          
45 See, for example, Sim v HM Advocate [2016] HCJAC 48, 2016 JC 174; Carey v HMA [2016] HCJAC 10, 2016 SLT 
377 
46 See, for example, Parfinowski v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 123, 2014 SCCR 30, [24] (Lady Dorrian) 
47 Fiona Leverick, ‘The (Art and) Parting of the Ways: Joint Criminal Liability for Homicide” (2012) Scots Law 
Times 227, 231 
48 McKinnon v HM Advocate 2003 JC 29 
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an accused is guilty of murder art and part where, first, by his conduct, for 
example his words or actions, he actively associates himself with a common 
criminal purpose which is or includes the taking of human life or carries the 
obvious risk that human life will be taken, and, secondly, in the carrying out 
of that purpose murder is committed by someone else.49 
Rather than wicked intention or wicked recklessness, this active association with such a risk 
(where life is in fact taken) constitutes the mens rea for murder on an art and part basis.50  The 
rule can have serious consequences.  In the leading case of McKinnon51 for example, there was 
a common plan to commit robbery using chef’s knives as a weapon.  The forensic evidence 
indicated that the fatal stab wounds had most likely been inflicted by only one co-accused but 
four of the co-accused were convicted of murder on the art and part basis. Since the purpose of 
art and part is to ensure that responsibility is brought home to those who are associated with a 
crime but who may not actually have carried it out,52 it is at least logical that all should be 
convicted of the same crime.  
Nonetheless, and somewhat less logically, where the conduct with fatal consequences arises 
spontaneously, there is scope for each accused to be judged on his or her own actions, yet still 
under the ambit of art and part liability.  The issue is whether the co-accused shared a common 
murderous purpose:53 
Where [a co-accused] is not proved to have associated himself [sic] with that 
[common murderous] purpose [ie carrying the obvious risk that human life 
will be taken] or is proved to have participated in some less serious common 
                                                          
49 Ibid [32] (LJ-G Cullen) 
50 Poole v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 42, 2009 SCCR 577 [11] (Lord Kingarth) 
51 (n 48) 
52 See, for example, Lord Patrick’s charge to the jury in Lappen v HM Advocate 1956 SLT 109 
53 Parfinowski (n 46) [24] (Lady Dorrian) 
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criminal purpose in the course of which the victim dies, [that] accused may 
be guilty art and part of culpable homicide, whether or not any other person 
is proved guilty of murder.54 
The art and part principle is thus operating to make the co-accused guilty of a homicide offence 
– to draw him/her into taking responsibility (albeit at a lower level) for the death – whilst 
deeming the offence itself, potentially at least, one of murder.  Given that the essence of art 
and part liability is that the co-accused shared the same criminal purpose, this may be 
problematic. 
In Carey v HM Advocate55 the death arose from a fracas in a flat in Saltcoats during which the 
deceased was punched, kicked and, ultimately stabbed in the chest.  The co-accused Carey was 
charged and convicted of culpable homicide and this was upheld on appeal but his conviction 
stood on an art and part basis with the other co-accused, McCulloch, who inflicted the fatal 
wound and was charged with, and convicted of, murder. Lord Justice-Clerk Carloway stated 
‘[t]here appears to be an illogicality in this approach; that a person can be art and part guilty of 
culpable homicide when the victim is found to have been murdered, but this is the law as it 
presently stands’56 
It is, presumably, always better for an accused person to be convicted of culpable homicide 
than of murder and this ‘illogicality’ does allow such an outcome.  This potential benefit to a 
co-accused can be seen in a case such as Parfinowski v HM Advocate,57 where there was clear 
evidence of the accused’s participation in a fatal attack but insufficient evidence that his or her 
own purpose was, during that attack, murderous.  In this case, the deceased was killed by a 
(spontaneous) attack with a baseball bat accompanied by punching, kicking and stamping.  The 
                                                          
54 McKinnon (n 48) [32] (LJ-G Cullen) 
55 (n 45) 
56 Ibid [29] (LJ-C Carloway) 
57 (n 46) 
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fatal blow was delivered by a co-accused named Robertson.  Parfinowski had apparently, prior 
to the attack with the bat, punched the deceased and, subsequent to it, he had kicked him. 
Parfinowski was, however, wearing light canvas shoes and the forensic evidence was that, his 
kicks could not have caused the fatal injuries.  Also, it could not be stated with confidence that 
he had shared the murderous purpose.  A conviction of culpable homicide was substituted for 
the murder conviction58 because the jury had not been instructed that this was possible when 
the evidence, did, in fact support such a conclusion.  Lady Dorrian explained that ‘[o]n the 
evidence, it could be said that there was scope for a finding that there were striking differences 
between the actions of the first accused and the appellant.’59 
In such circumstances, then, the ability to return different verdicts even though the conviction 
for homicide at all still depends on the existence of art and part liability may be viewed by the 
accused as an advantage.  Nonetheless, it does not resolve the logical problem outlined above 
which, as Lord Carloway also noted, ‘opens up the prospect of a conviction for homicide where 
the co-accused has not associated himself with a lethal attack.’60 
At the heart of art and part liability is the issue of the common criminal purpose to which the 
accused signed up.  If this question is addressed, as in Parfinowski, from the perspective of 
‘saving’ the accused from a murder conviction then the issue will be whether there is scope to 
say that the s/he did not share the murderous purpose.  In Carey, by contrast, it was eventually 
determined that the fatal blow had been inflicted by the co-accused (McCulloch).  If Carey had 
been judged on his own actions, then, he had not carried out the actus reus of homicide so he 
could only have been convicted of assault.  He was only able to be convicted of culpable 
homicide by being tied into the homicide element art and part. 
                                                          
58 ‘Andrew Parfinowski Brett Lodge Murder Conviction Quashed’ (BBC News, 19 November 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-25001625>  accessed 12 January 2018 
59 Parfinowski (n 46) [24] 
60 Carey (n 45) [27], discussing Brown v HM Advocate 1993 SCCR 382 
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It is not quite clear how the common criminal purpose is being defined for these purposes, 
however.  The ‘obvious risk of life being taken’ test applies to the common plan – that is to 
cases involving pre-concert.  The mens rea of murder on an individual basis is, of course, 
wicked intention to kill or wicked recklessness.  As will be discussed in more detail below, the 
mens rea for involuntary culpable homicide is not directed towards the bringing about of death.  
How then can it be determined that the criminal purpose to which an individual co-accused 
signed up falls somewhere between assault only and murderousness? It is (involuntary 
unlawful act) culpable homicide where an assault causes death but, almost by definition, in 
those circumstances, the criminal purpose is not towards death.  Involuntary means that the 
death was not contemplated.  It is hard to think of a common criminal purpose to commit 
culpable homicide per se.  In such cases, the accused is getting the benefit of the decision that 
his/her crime is not murder – but if s/he only joined into an assault and is horrified that another 
co-accused caused death a culpable homicide verdict may be cold comfort. 
Given that the incidents from which the relevant deaths occur are often fast-moving and, by 
definition, involve a number of people, it is not always easy to impose the legal framework on 
the facts.  It is also fair to say that these cases frequently involve relatively extreme violence.  
Culpable homicide allows the law to recognise, in spite of this, that such acts, even such as 
cause death, should still be legally graduated.  They also illustrate the crime’s close proximity 
to murder in such cases. 
It is clear, also, that where the art and part concept arises spontaneously, the definition of 
involuntary culpable homicide on an individual basis can come into play and attention will now 
be turned to this. 
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Involuntary Culpable Homicide 
Where culpable homicide is the crime charged from the outset it is trite to say that the accused’s 
fault or the circumstances attending the death are of a lesser order of seriousness than for 
murder.  In terms of fair labelling,61 this seems helpful, but it is worth bearing in mind that the 
accused is still being labelled a killer.  It is unclear to what extent this favourable distinction 
from “murderer” is recognised in the popular consciousness. It is therefore important to look 
at the operation of involuntary culpable homicide and to see to what it attaches 
blameworthiness. 
 
Unlawful Act Type 
As noted above, different rules apply depending on whether the death arises from a lawful or 
an unlawful act on the part of the accused – though the category of unlawful act is narrow.  
This form of the crime is found where the accused carries out an unlawful act and 
(unanticipated) death results.  In general, the unlawful act will be an assault on the victim, 
following from the historical position recognised by both Hume62 and Archibald Alison where 
one category of culpable homicide was constituted ‘By the unintentional deprivation of life, in 
pursuance of an intention not to kill, but to do some inferior bodily injury, from which it was 
not probable that death would follow’.63 
It is not the case that, where an accused is engaged in any criminal act whatsoever and death 
results, this constitutes unlawful act type.  Indeed, assault is probably the only crime which is 
accepted without question as the basis for it.64 Scots law is then somewhat more restricted in 
                                                          
61 See James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71 MLR 217 
62 n (19) (second category) 
63 Archibald Alison, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland (William Blackwood 1832) 92 
64 The view has also been expressed that death arising from fire-raising might constitute unlawful act type 
culpable homicide because fire is so volatile that a particular duty to take care arises.  See Gordon (n 33) para 
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the underlying crimes which can constitute this form of culpable homicide than are those other 
jurisdictions which require only criminality and dangerousness.65  
The criterion for relevant unlawful acts is affirmed in MacAngus v HM Advocate66 where it is 
stated that ‘there appears to be no support for the view that unlawful act culpable homicide can 
be made out except where, as in assault or analogous cases, the conduct is directed in some 
way against the victim.’67 
As a crime, assault, in Scots law, requires an attack on the person of another68 carried out with 
evil intent which is defined as intent to cause immediate bodily harm or the fear of immediate 
bodily harm.69  The mens rea for culpable homicide arising from an unlawful act is simply that 
for that underlying offence.  The usual rules of causation apply so that the accused must take 
the victim as s/he finds him/her. Thus if, even very slight, violence, activates a pre-existing 
condition and the victim dies, culpable homicide is a possible outcome.70 In charging the jury 
in HMA v Hartley,71 Lord Sutherland gave this example 
So, to take an example, if you are having an argument with somebody and 
give him a punch on the chin, not a very hard one, but a punch on the chin, 
and he is taken aback and stumbles backwards, catches his heel on the kerb 
of the pavement, falls over, cracks his skull and dies, you would be guilty of 
culpable homicide because you have committed an unlawful act, an assault 
                                                          
31-27 n 167 referring to Mathieson v HMA 1981 SCCR 196.  By contrast, the case of Sutherland v HMA 1994 JC 
62 found that death arising from fire-raising had to be treated as lawful act type. 
65 See Tony Storey, “Unlawful and Dangerous: A Comparative Analysis of Unlawful Act Manslaughter in English, 
Australian and Canadian Law” (2017) 81 Journal of Criminal Law 143 
66 (n 16) 
67 Ibid [29] (LJ-G Hamilton) 
68 Macdonald (n 5) 176 
69 Smart v HMA 1975 JC 30, 33 (LJ-C Wheatley) 
70 As in Bird (n 8) where the accused had caused the victim considerable fear but had used very little actual 
violence against her.  By contrast in Gay v HM Advocate [2017] HCJAC 62, 2017 SCL 913, the accused punched 
the deceased in the face and he died very shortly afterwards having suffered from a number of underlying 
conditions.  Gay was convicted by the jury only of assault to the severe injury. 
71 1989 SLT 135 
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by punching him, and as a direct consequence of that act he sustained injuries 
from which he died.72 
In Gay v HMA73 the accused inflicted a single punch on the victim who died subsequently in 
hospital.  He had sustained injury to his chin and to the back of his head as well as a fractured 
jaw and was found to have had a cardiac arrest.  He suffered from underlying health issues 
including heart disease.74  The jury convicted Gay of assault to the severe injury on a charge 
of culpable homicide.  The case is reported only as an appeal against sentence so there is no 
discussion of the principles of the substantive law.  While juries are always free to return any 
verdict open to them, this does at least suggest that there is scope for criminal culpability to be 
tailored to the accused’s perceived blameworthiness so that it is not always necessary to label 
him/her a killer simply because death ensued following his/her initial act.  Culpable homicide 
then also occupies this territory at the opposite end of the seriousness spectrum from murder 
where death has resulted but, for whatever reason, it is not ultimately deemed appropriate to 
attach the stigma of a homicide conviction, only that of assault 
 
Lawful Act Type 
In Sutherland v HM Advocate75 fire-raising to defraud insurers was not accepted as a relevant 
unlawful act76 because it is not a crime against the person.77  To convict of culpable homicide, 
                                                          
72 Ibid 136.  Issues arising in relation to so-called “one punch assaults” including dangerousness, are discussed 
in Jason Schreiber, Angela Williams and David Ranson, “Kings to Cowards: One-Punch Assaults” (2016) 44 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 332 
73 (n 70) 
74 “Kirkcaldy Football Coach Acquitted of Culpable Homicide” (Fife Today, 8 March 2017) < 
https://www.fifetoday.co.uk/news/crime/kirkcaldy-football-coach-acquitted-of-culpable-homicide-1-
4386743> accessed 6 January 2018 
75 (n 64) 
76 Ibid 68 (LJ-G Hope setting out ground of appeal) 
77 Ibid 65 (LJ-G Hope explaining trial judge’s directions) 
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therefore, recklessness78 on the accused’s part was required.  In other words, because the 
underlying act was not directed against the victim in the necessary way, lawful act type was 
deemed the appropriate form.  Because any conviction will always be simply for culpable 
homicide, this potential overlap, or slippage between lawful and unlawful act is not likely to 
be problematic in practice.  The complexity is that certain acts which do, in fact, constitute 
criminal offences (like fire-raising to defraud insurers) need to follow the rules of lawful act 
type (ie actus reus of the destruction of life; mens rea of recklessness) for a culpable homicide 
conviction to ensue. 
The category of crimes which can be unequivocally seen to be directed against the victim (ie 
assault alone) is, thus, pretty narrow.  Behaviour constituting other criminal offences will be 
placed in the lawful act category for culpable homicide purposes.  This may be confusing 
semantically – but possibly only at that level.  The issue arises particularly in cases where the 
accused supplied drugs to the victim with his/her consent (or even at his/her request) and s/he 
ultimately died from ingesting these.79  While, clearly, supply of a controlled drug is an offence 
in terms of s 4(3)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the law is that ‘a charge libelling culpable 
homicide in the context of the supplying (or the administration of) a controlled drug is relevant 
only if the Crown offers to prove that the supplying (or the administration) of the drug was in 
the circumstances reckless.’80 Scots law recognises two relevant crimes of recklessness – 
causing real injury as in Khaliq v HM Advocate81 and causing reckless injury from HM 
Advocate v Harris.82  Either of these crimes might be appropriately directed against the victim 
(Khaliq was selling glue-sniffing kits to children in the knowledge that this was the (harmful) 
                                                          
78 Ibid 67, variously described as fire-raising ‘done in the face of obvious risks which were or should have been 
guarded against or in circumstances which showed a complete disregard for any potential dangers which 
might result’ and, more simply ‘criminal negligence’ (LJ-G Hope) 
79 See Lord Advocate’s Reference No 1 of 1994 1996 JC 76; MacAngus (n 16) 
80 MacAngus (n 16) [30] (LJ-G Hamilton) 
81 1984 JC 23 
82 1993 JC 150 
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purpose for which they would be used; Harris was a bouncer who ejected a woman from a 
nightclub by pushing her in such a way that she fell down a flight of stairs and out onto the 
road where she was run over by a passing car.)  Where either of these crimes is committed and 
death results it will not be clear whether lawful or unlawful act type culpable homicide has 
been committed since both have the mens rea of recklessness.  Conviction for the overarching 
generic offence allows access to the full gamut of sentencing options from admonishment83 
through community service84 to a (discretionary) life sentence85 so that there is scope for a 
nuanced approach to overall blameworthiness.  The lawful / unlawful act dichotomy in such a 
case is therefore of limited significance.  It does however matter considerably to an accused 
who has committed another type of crime from which death resulted.  The need to establish 
recklessness protects him/her from conviction of a homicide offence where this was completely 
outwith his/her contemplation. 
The development of lawful act type recognises the need for the law to identify sufficient fault 
on the accused’s part that conviction of a criminal offence is warranted. Paton v HM 
Advocate,86 which has been influential in defining recklessness more generally, noted this fault 
requirement whilst not wholeheartedly welcoming it.  Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison said 
There is evidence in the case that the appellant was driving his car at a fairly 
high speed, and there is also evidence in the case that there was, perhaps, a 
want of care. The difficulty that the case presents is whether there was 
evidence that the appellant was guilty of criminal negligence in the sense in 
which we use that expression. At one time the rule of law was that any blame 
was sufficient, where death resulted, to justify a verdict of guilty of culpable 
                                                          
83 Brady (n 27) 
84 Docherty v HM Advocate 2000 SCCR 106 (300 hours community service) 
85 K (A Child) v HM Advocate 1993 SLT 237 (detention without limit of time for a child-accused aged 12); 
Kirkwood v HM Advocate 1939 JC 36 (penal servitude for life) 
86 1936 JC 19 
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homicide. Unfortunately, this law has to some extent been modified by 
decisions of the Court, and it is now necessary to show gross, or wicked, or 
criminal negligence, something amounting, or at any rate analogous, to a 
criminal indifference to consequences, before a jury can find culpable 
homicide proved.87 
While in Paton the accused was charged with culpable homicide (though ultimately convicted 
of a lesser motoring offence) it is interesting that this concept of recklessness, used as the fault 
element, is disconnected completely from the issue of the destruction of life.  Thus, the concept 
has developed in both lawful act culpable homicide cases and cases of other, non-fatal, crimes 
of recklessness.  Paton’s definition of recklessness was quoted with approval in Quinn v 
Cunningham,88 a case relating to riding a bicycle recklessly (though without causing death).  
Lord Justice-General Clyde offered the further definition of ‘an utter disregard of what the 
consequences of the act in question may be so far as the public are concerned’89 and ‘a 
recklessness so high as to involve an indifference to the consequences for the public 
generally’.90  Finally Transco plc v HM Advocate,91 - an (unsuccessful) attempt to prosecute a 
company for bringing about the deaths of a family of four in a gas explosion - whilst broadly 
accepting the concept, took issue with the circularity of the Paton definition. Lord Justice-
General Hamilton stated ‘There may be some difficulty in regarding Lord Justice-Clerk 
Aitchison's observation as a comprehensive definition — not least because of the circularity 
which arises from the use (twice) of the adjective “criminal” in the definition of the crime. But 
it does at least point … to a degree of want of care which is grave.’92 
                                                          
87 Ibid 22 
88 1956 JC 22 
89 ibid 24 
90 Ibid 25 
91 (n 12) 
92 Ibid [37] 
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There are two issues here.  The first is the rather unsatisfactory way in which this central 
concept of recklessness is defined.  The other is the disconnect between the mentes reae of 
lawful and unlawful act culpable homicide and the victim’s death. 
 
Absence of Reference to Homicidal Attitude 
Considering, first, the latter point - murder arises where the accused causes death either 
intending to do so (wicked intention to kill) or intending to cause (only) physical injury together 
with an indifference as to whether the victim lived or died (wicked recklessness).  Both of these 
formulations encapsulate blameworthiness arising from the accused’s aim, or, at least, 
acceptance of causing the death of the victim.  The mens rea components of culpable homicide 
(which are that of the underlying (non-fatal) offence for unlawful act type and recklessness for 
lawful act type) by contrast, make no reference to death whatsoever.  Culpable homicide is a 
serious offence.  It is, for example, sometimes charged in road traffic cases on the basis that 
‘the degree of culpability required to prove that charge is greater than that required for the 
statutory offences and in particular is greater than that required for s 1 of the Road Traffic Act, 
causing death by dangerous driving’.93 Its mens rea elements however are the same as for non-
fatal offences and, in recklessness, even for the crime of reckless endangerment94 which 
requires only the creation of a foreseeable risk without any actual adverse consequences.  How, 
then, is its seriousness to be gauged alongside these other crimes of recklessness?  The principle 
of actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea95 is generally applied in Scots law meaning that the 
act cannot be reprehensible unless the mind is also guilty.  If it is accepted that the mental 
                                                          
93 HMA v McDowall 1999 SLT 243, 245 (Lord Abernethy’s charge to the jury).  In Purcell v HMA (n 10), the 
driving was considered so dangerous that the Crown initially tried to charge the accused with murder.  This 
was unsuccessful 
94 See Cameron v Maguire 1999 JC 63; Robson v Spiers 1999 SLT 1141 
95 See also Jeremy Horder, ‘Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea’ (1997) 113 LQR 95, 95 
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element is deemed to confer blameworthiness in this way, then it is noticeable that involuntary 
culpable homicide’s mens rea elements are the same as those of the non-fatal offences of 
assault (unlawful act type) and various crimes of recklessness (lawful act type). This, therefore, 
brings the behavioural component (the destruction of life) into focus in terms of allocating 
culpability.  Since the mental element equates to that of non-fatal offences, presumably it must 
be the fact of causing death – of violating the value placed on the sanctity of life or breaching 
the victim’s right to life – which supplies culpable homicide’s seriousness.  Thus, if it is 
accepted that it is the mental element which generally imputes blameworthiness (and, 
potentially, degrees of blameworthiness)96 then it become necessary to accept that the act of 
destroying the life of another is, in itself, so wholly unacceptable that it is given a leading role 
not necessarily accorded to the behavioural element in other crimes in determining culpability 
within culpable homicide.  Nonetheless, killing on its own is far from sufficient and the concept 
of recklessness used as the mental element in lawful act type is worthy of some scrutiny 
 
Recklessness 
Findlay Stark has undertaken an exhaustive and meticulous critical analysis of the (many) 
concepts of recklessness applied in Scots law97 concluding, in part, that culpable homicide’s 
recklessness is not, and should not be, different to that employed in non-fatal crimes against 
the person.98 It is not entirely clear whether, for this purpose, it has to denote a state of mind99 
so that the accused recognised, in his/her own mind, a risk and chose to ignore it, or whether it 
                                                          
96 See, for example, see Michael D Bayles, ‘Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility’ (1982) 1 Law and 
Philosophy 5 
97 Findlay Stark, ‘Rethinking Recklessness [2011] Juridical Review 163 
98 Ibid 180 
99 Transco plc No 1 v HMA (n 12) 
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can simply be inferred from the quality of the behaviour.100  MacAngus v HM Advocate101 
insisted on the need for recklessness in cases of death resulting from the supply of a controlled 
drug but it may also illustrate the vagaries of identifying the existence of the concept.  The 
appeal court heard the conjoined appeals of Kevin MacAngus and of Michael Kane in relation 
to entirely separate incidents.  MacAngus had supplied ketamine to a number of people known 
to him at their request and the deceased has selected how much to ingest (or ‘snort’herself).  
Kane, on the other hand, administered heroin (by injection) to the deceased who was unable to 
do this for herself and, having seen her slump to the ground and having been informed that the 
other (assault) victim (who did not die) had never taken heroin before, he proceeded to inject 
him also.  Are both equally reckless?  The case was brought as a preliminary plea to the 
relevance of the charges so the outcome is not reported. 
A further key point is that, unlike in English law, the deceased’s voluntary intervention does 
not necessarily break the chain of causation between the supply and the death102 and the appeal 
court linked the causal question directly to the existence of recklessness.  Lord Justice-General 
Hamilton said 
Moreover, while causation is distinct from the mens rea of the accused, the 
foundation in Scots law of the charge of culpable homicide in cases of this 
kind (namely, recklessness) is not, in our view, wholly irrelevant. The law 
can with justification more readily treat the reckless, as against the merely 
unlawful, actor as responsible for the consequences of his actions, including 
consequences in the form of actings by those to whom he directs such 
recklessness. Reckless conduct, judged in the context of any vulnerability of 
                                                          
100 Stark 184 
101 MacAngus (n 16) 
102 Ibid 
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the victim, may of its nature have a compelling force.  … Subject always to 
questions of immediacy and directness, the law may properly attribute 
responsibility for ingestion, and so for death, to the reckless offender.103  
Such a formulation effectively removes the agency of the victim in deciding to ingest a 
potentially harmful substance104 and relies heavily on the accused’s recklessness as a 
justification.  English law has taken a different course and has determined that the voluntary 
act of the deceased, certainly in freely administering controlled drugs supplied by a defendant, 
negates any criminal liability on that defendant’s part.  Here, again, then, is a possible example 
of culpable homicide’s liminal quality, occupying a space in relation to the destruction of the 
life of another which in another jurisdiction has been regarded as not criminally blameworthy. 
 
Conclusion 
Culpable homicide serves an important function in Scots criminal law.  It offers two certainties: 
(1) it cannot be charged unless the accused’s behaviour has brought about the death of someone 
else; and (2) it is always less serious than murder.  As such, it covers a broad range of terrain 
sweeping up killings the seriousness of which places them on the borderline with murder at 
one edge and crossing a range of its own territory, through clear examples of its involuntary 
and voluntary forms, to reach fatal behaviours which might almost escape criminal liability 
altogether or at least the stigma carried by a homicide conviction in any form.  Culpable 
homicide facilitates fair labelling within the homicide category, censures violations of the 
                                                          
103 Ibid [45] 
104 For a fuller discussion see Alan Reed, ‘Culpable Homicide and Drug Administration’ (2009) 73 Journal of 
Criminal Law 207; and Lindsay Farmer, ‘MacAngus (Kevin) v HM Advocate: ‘Practical Yet Nonetheless 
Principled”?’ (2009) 13 Edinburgh Law Review 502 
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principle of the sanctity of life and recognises the gravity and the distress caused by taking life, 
even where this is not done intentionally or wickedly. 
When approached on a murder / not murder binary, as an attempt to argue that the Crown has 
not proved the more serious crime, its own principles may be a little subsumed in the attempt 
to establish that those of murder have not been made out.  Taken on its own terms, however, it 
offers a relatively reasoned set of formulations for determining when a killing is, as its name 
suggests, criminally culpable.  In its involuntary forms, the absence of any reference to a mental 
attitude specifically encompassing killing demonstrates again the significance which it attaches 
to the act of ending another’s life.  Overall, it offers an interesting perspective on mechanisms 
for criminalising a generally abhorrent behaviour (killing) where this takes place in 
circumstances which the accused did not orchestrate for the purpose. 
